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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the issue of copyright ownership to a scholarly
work that is written by a university faculty member.' The analysis will
include a general discussion of copyright law, including the work for hire
doctrine, the development and applicability of the common law exception
to the work for hire doctrine for academic writings, whether a university
professor publishing a scholarly article is "within the scope of
employment," web page publishing issues for professors who want to put
their papers online and a discussion of the most practical strategies for
professors who want to claim copyright ownership to their scholarly
works.2
B.A. 1994 Emory University; J.D. 1998 University of Miami School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Michael Froomkin for suggesting this paper topic and for providing guidance
throughout the research, writing and editing process. Also, thanks is owed to Professor Liii Levi for some
early comments on how to best approach this topic. Finally, thanks to my parents, Lawrence and Susan
Borow for a lifetime of caring, support and encouragement.
I The term university as used in this article refers to any school of higher education beyond the
secondary school system.
2 The fact that the scholarly work is found on a web page will be considered a means of
publication of the faculty work. The the term professor as used in this article will refer to any faculty
member at a university.
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW BASICS
The origins for United States copyright laws are found in the
Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. 3  This clause "permits Congress to grant
authors certain rights with regard to the works they create."4 The reasoning
behind the founding fathers offering copyright protection was to "reward
individual artists for their creative genius by granting them a limited
monopoly over the duplication and distribution of their works."5  In the
case of a university professor, copyright protection offers the professor an
incentive to produce new scholarly works. Society then gains from the
introduction of the new works, which tends to improve the overall qualify
of life in the community. However, the "copyright monopoly is limited so
that the public cannot be deprived permanently of the benefits of the work
created."6
The first United States Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. Since then,
there have been four subsequent major revisions, the most recent being the
Copyright Act of 1976.7 The 1976 Act,8 which was a general revision of
federal copyright law, 9 provides copyright protection for "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."' 0 This includes
literary works like a professor's scholarly article." A work becomes
protected "at the very instant that... a word is written on a page or encoded
onto a computer disk."' 2 Additionally, "an author is not required to register
a copyright, nor even affix a copyright notice to the work to obtain
copyright safeguards." 13 The 1976 Act, which was a general revision of
federal copyright law, makes it clear that copyright ownership "is distinct
from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied."' 4
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 8.
4 Michael J. Luzum and Daniel S. Pupel, Jr., Weinstein v. University of Illinois: The "Work-For-
Hire" Doctrine and Procedural Due Process for Nontenured Faculty, 15 J.C. & U.L 369, 372 (1989).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Sherri L Burr, A Critical Assessment of Reid's Work for Hire Framework and Its Potential
Impact on the Marketplace for Scholarly Works, 24 J. MARSHALL L REv. 119, 120 (1990).
8 Hereafter the 1976 Act will be refered to as "the Act."
9 Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75
IOWAL REV. 381,386 (1990).
10 17 U.S.C. §101(1) (1990).
11 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 383.
12 Id. at 384.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 386.
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Thus, in a situation where a scholarly article appears on a university owned
web page, the ownership of the web page is separate from the ownership of
the copyright to the scholarly article.
Copyright ownership is a unique form of proprietorship. 5 The Act
provides that initial ownership of the "bundle" of copyrights vests in the
author of the work.16 While it is true that the Act does not define the term
"author," the Supreme Court, over one hundred years ago, construed the
term to mean the person "to whom anything owes its origin; originator;
maker.. .,,17
In order to determine who owns a copyright, the relevant federal statute
is 17 U.S.C. §201, entitled "Ownership of Copyright." Section 201(a)
states that a "copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.' 18 If this statute is taken on its face, it
appears that the professor would own the copyright to his scholarly article,
as the author of the work. However, a legal concept called "work for hire"
makes this answer less clear in an employment situation.
Work made for hire is covered in two sections of the 1976 Copyright
Act. First, a definition of "work made for hire" can be found at 17 U.S.C.
§101.19 This section breaks down the definition into two distinct
categories. "Subsection (1) defines work made for hire as a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."20
Alternatively, "subsection (2) defines 'work for hire' as work ordered or
commissioned for use as a collective work, as a translation, as part of a
motion picture, as an atlas, as a compilation.. ,21
Section 201(b) of the 1976 Act also deals with the work for hire
doctrine. This section states that "in the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright." This provision appears to make the
university, as the employer, the holder of the copyright for the scholarly
works of its employees. In the case of works made for hire, the employer is
considered the author of the work, and is regarded as the initial owner of
2copyright unless there has been an express agreement otherwise. If the
15 Id.
16 Id. at 387.
17 Id.
18 17 U.S.C. §201(a) (1990).
19 17 U.S.C. §101 (1990).
20 Luzum, supra note 4, at 373.
21 Id.
22 17 U.S.C. §201 (b) (1990).
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parties wish to alter this relationship, "any agreement under which the
employee is to own rights must be in writing and signed by the parties. 23
III. THE EXCEPTION TO WORK FOR HIRE
FOR ACADEMIC WRITINGS
According to the legislative history of the 1976 Act, "Congress did not
intend to change the law prior to the 1976 Act regarding work for hire
when a regular employment relationship exists." 24 Therefore, in order "to
evaluate what works created by a teacher should be considered works for
hire under the 1976 Act, it is critical to understand the interpretation of
works for hire under the prior law." 25 This prior law was the Copyright Act
of 190926, which was in effect from 1909 through December 31, 1978.
Under the older Copyright Act, "courts and commentators regarded the
work for hire doctrine, as largely inapplicable to teachers." 27  The most
well known of these commentators is "the leading authority in the
copyright field, 28 Melville B. Nimmer.29  Nimmer's view was "that
professors own the copyright to scholarly work '30 because "courts
fashioned a 'teacher exception' to the work for hire rules. '31
Nimmer refers to two common law cases, Sherrill v. Grieves and
Williams v. Weisser,33 for creating the academic exception to the work for
hire doctrine. In both of these cases, the courts "considered the work made
for hire concept with respect to professors but did not find works made for
hire, in a large part due to policy and custom. '34 In the United States, these
two cases alone comprise the judicial "authority prior to the 1976 Act for
the existence of an exception from the work made for hire doctrine for
23 Id.
24 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 388.
25 Id.
26 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
27 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and The Copyright Act Of 1976, 54 U. Cmi.
L REV. 590,591 (1987).
29 Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made For Hire" Under the 1976
Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L 485, 499 (1982-83).
29 Melville B. Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §5.03[B] (1984). Nimmer bases his conclusion
on dicta in a number of cases; see Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App. 1969).
30 Simon, supra note 28, at 499.
31 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 597. See also I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT at §5.03[B][1][b][i] and
§5.03[B] n.31.
32 57 Wash. L Rep. 286 (D.C. Cit. 1929).
33 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (CL App. 1969).
34 Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay
Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L REV. 223, 233 (1992).
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professors." 35 Most interestingly, these cases, "stand in stark contrast to
the general rule that the copyright to works created pursuant to an
employment relationship vest with the employer.
3 6
Sherrill and Williams do follow an English tradition that allowed a
professor to own copyright in their works.37 That tradition stems from the
1825 English case of Abernethy v. Hutchinson,38 where Lord Elton held
that "precedent warranted a recognition of a litigant's claim to ownership
of his lectures in medicine" since Sir William Blackstone had been found
to own the copyright to his lectures on law.
39
In Sherrill v. Grieves,40 the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
held that "a professor's works are excepted from the work made for hire
doctrine.' In this case, the issue was whether a military instructor's book
for his classes fell under the work for hire provisions of the 1909 Act.
41
The instructor, Mr. Sherrill, "taught military sketching, map reading, and
surveying to United States Army officers, and prepared and wrote a
textbook on these subjects. 43  Prior to publication, "Sherrill allowed
United States military authorities to print a pamphlet incorporating the
section from his textbook on military sketching." 44  The defendants
published an infringing work, but when sued, they argued that Sherrill did
not own the copyright to his academic writing since his work was a work
for hire.45 The court disagreed and held that Sherrill owned the copyright
"because a professor is not obliged to reduce his or her lectures to writing,
if he or she does so the lectures do not become the property of the
employing institution."46 The case is important because it was the first
judicial case in the United States that recognized an exception to the work
for hire doctrine for an academic work product.
Williams v. Weisser,47 a 1969 California Court of Appeals case, more
"explicitly excepted the works of professors from the work made for hire
35 Id.
36 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 392.
37 Robert A. Gorman and Jane C. Ginsburg. COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 266-67 (editor 4th ed.
1993) (original date).
38 3 L.J. 209, 214-15 (Ch.) (1825).
39 Gornan, supra note 37, at 267.
40 57 Wash. L Rep. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
41 Lape, supra note 34, at 235.
42 Margaret D. Smith and Perry A. Zirkel, Implications of CCNV v. Reid for the Educator Author:
Who Owns the Copyright?, 63 ED. LAW REP. 703, fn. 59 (1991).
43 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 394.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Burr, supra note 7, at 140.
47 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
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doctrine. 48 In that case, "a California court of appeals enjoined a student
from publishing his lecture notes."' 49 Williams, an anthropology professor
at UCLA sued Weisser, the owner of a company that sold lecture notes
from UCLA classes.50 In order to obtain the notes from Professor
Williams' most recent class, Weisser hired a student in the class take
detailed notes and then to turn over the notes to Weisser's company, called
Class Notes.51 Weisser then proceeded to reproduce the notes and sell
them to other students in the class.52 Professor Williams sued Weisser for
infringing on the copyright of his lectures.53 Weisser's defense was that
Professor Williams lacked standing to sue him, since the university, not
Professor Williams owned the copyright to his lectures under the work for
hire doctrine. 54 The court disagreed with this argument and "found that the
student's professor, and not the university the student attended, owned the
common law copyright to the professor's lectures. 55 The court based it's
ruling on the academic exception precedent established in Sherrill v.
Grieves.56  The court's reasoning for not applying the work for hire
doctrine was the "University's lack of supervision and control, the absence
of a motive for the University to own the copyright, and the 'undesirable
consequences' that would flow from granting ownership to the University,
e.g., the restraint on a professor's mobility. 5
Commentators have relied on these two cases to assert "that prior to the
adoption of the 1976 Act the work made for hire provision of federal
copyright law did not apply to the works of professors. 58 The decision in
Williams is especially important because the "Williams court appears to
have recognized that academic tradition, which had always assumed that
professors owned the copyrights to their works, was incongruous with
copyright law and its attendant work for hire doctrine. 59  The court
"conceded that its decision carved out an exception to the general rule" and
noted that "a rule of law developed in one context should not be blindly
applied in another where it violates the intention of the parties and creates
48 Lape, supra note 34, 235.
49 Simon, supra note 28, at fn 5.
50 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542, fn 1.
51 Id. At 542.
52 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 393.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Simon, supra note 28, at fn. 5.
56 57 Wash. L Rep. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
57 VerStegg, supra note 9, at 393. See also Willaims, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
55 Lape. supra note 34, at 236.
59 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 395.
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undesirable consequences." '6 Thus, Williams stands for "the proposition
that works created by teachers summon forth a 'teacher exception' to the
work for hire doctrine." 61
The next relevant case to the academic exception to work for hire was
Weinstein v. University of Illinois,62 which was a 1987 case from the
Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. The case dealt with
the work for hire issue in relation to faculty publishing and was decided by
63Judge Easterbrook, a former law professor. In Weinstein, Judge
Easterbrook held that a professor owned the copyright to his published
work because the University of Illinois had adopted "a policy defining
'work for hire' for professors." 64 This policy, which "was incorporated
into each professor's contract with the University," stated that "a professor
retains the copyright unless the work falls" into one of three specified
categories. 65  The third of these categories6 stated that the university
retained the copyright to "works created as a specific requirement of
employment or as an assigned duty., 67 The district court68 had held that
Weinstein's work was covered by this paragraph because "the university
funded the clerkship program" that the scholarly article was about "and
because, as a clinical professor, Weinstein was required to conduct and
write about clinical programs." 69 However, Judge Easterbrook ruled that
the district court failed to recognize the fact that the three categories from
the university policy were exceptions to the "rule that faculty members own
the copyrights in their academic work. 70  This is an important statement
because it is an explicit judicial recognition of the academic tradition. The
appellate court went on to say that when Weinstein was told that he needed
to write more scholarly articles to obtain tenure, he was not being told that
it was a "requirement or duty" of his job within the meaning of paragraph
three of the university copyright policy.7l  Thus, the court held that
Weinstein's scholarly writing was not work for hire because his work did
60 Id.
61 Id. at 396.
62 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
63 Gorman, supra note 37, at 267.
64 Weinstein v. University of llinois, 811 F. 2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
65 Id.
66 This third category is also known as "paragraph three." See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.
67 Id.
6 Weinstein v. University of Ilinois, 628 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. M. 1986).
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not fall under the university copyright policy, but instead fell under the
academic exception to the work for hire doctrine.72
It is important to note that the Weinstein court looked beyond the
employment "contract to incorporate the academic tradition into its
",73terms. The court did this because it found that granting teachers an
exception to the work for hire doctrine "has been the academic tradition
since copyright law began . . . the tradition covers scholarly articles and
other intellectual property. 74  The court added that a professor "who
proves a new theorem in the course of his employment will own the
copyright to his article containing that proof."75 Thus, the Weinstein court
felt that the common law academic exception to the work for hire doctrine
needed to be applied.
There was however one part of the Weinstein decision that was not
beneficial for professors who want copyright ownership to their scholarly
works. This was the court's statement that the work for hire statute is
"general enough to make every academic article a 'work for hire' and
therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars.
76
However, the court's explicit recognition that the academic exception for
scholarly articles belonging to their authors was still valid after the 1976
Copyright Act, was an important judicial statement. 77
Judge Easterbrook incorporated the academic tradition into Weinstein's
78
employment contract, thus salvaging the professor's copyright ownership.
Looking outside the specific terms of the contract is not new to
determinations of copyright ownership. In the case of May v. Morganelli-
Heumann & Associates, the Ninth Circuit stated that if a practice is
known to the parties or widely held, "the custom is an implied in fact term
of the contract" between the parties. 8 The Weinstein court relied upon
May to incorporate professional custom into the disputed contract, by
bringing academic tradition into the copyright agreement. The Weinstein
court appears to have stretched the May holding, because while May relied
72 Smith, supra note 42, at 712.
73 Luzum, supra note 4, at 374.
74 Id. See also M. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §5.03 [B] [1] [b] (1978 ed.).
73 Weinstein, 811 F. 2d at, 1094.
76 Id. Citing DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish or Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17
(1984).
77 This same analysis does not apply for patentable professorial creations because universities
traditionafly have required faculty members in the sciences to assign to their employers the patent rights to
their inventions. Thus, the teacher exception does not apply for patents because they are considered work
for hire. See Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at fn. 9.
78 LuAzun, supra note 4, at 375.
79 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
so Luzum, supra note 4, at 375.
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on custom in usage in the absence of any specific mention of an agreement
to that custom, Weinstein looked to academic tradition in spite of a specific
provision dealing with the vesting of copyrights that contradicted the
academic tradition.8'
One year after Weinstein in 1988, Judge Posner issued a ruling in Hays
v. Sony Corp. of America82 that strongly urges the recognition of a "teacher
exception" in dicta. 3 Interestingly, Judge Posner, was also a former law
professor. 84 The case involved two high school teachers who taught
business courses in a public school and who had written a manual
85
explaining how to operate the school's word processors . The Sony
Corporation of America "created a manual that incorporated sections of the
teachers' original manual verbatim" and thus, the teachers sued Sony for
86copyright infringement. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
discussed at length the applicability of the work for hire doctrine to works
created by school teachers.87 In this discussion, Judge Posner "commented
on but did not decide whether the teacher exception survived under the
Act."88 The reason he only commented instead of offering a holding on the
teacher exception was that the issue was not properly before the court, and
thus he was unable to make binding law with the case. Swayed by both the
"desirability of maintaining a professors' exception and the absence of any
indication that Congress intended to abolish the exception," the Hays court
stated that, "if forced to decide whether the 1976 Act had abolished the
exception, it might decide that the exception had survived" the revisions to
the copyright law. a9 Consequently, this was "persuasive dicta from a
federal circuit court which now supports the argument that teachers, not
schools, own the copyrights to materials that teachers create. 
9
Even with the academic exception apparently intact because of
common law, some commentators believe that Congress eliminated the
"exception to the work for hire doctrine when it passed the Copyright Act
of 1976."'9 Their argument is that the 1976 Act permits universities to
claim copyright to, and even 'authorship' of, their faculty's output.92 They
81 Id.
82 Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
83 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 406.
84 Gorman, supra note 63, at 267.
85 See generally Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
86 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 403.
87 Id.
88 Smith, supra note 42, at 712.
89 Lape, supra note 34, at 245.
90 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 382.
91 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 591. See also DuBoff, supra note 76 and Simon, supra note 28.
92 Id.
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make this claim because "the plain language of the 1976 Act and cases
decided thereunder appear to negate Williams as well as to demonstrate
that when teachers, or any employees, create copyrightable works pursuant
to the duties of their jobs, such are works for hire with the copyrights
vesting in the employer. 93 Thus, "scholars have indeed concluded that the
1976 Act abolishes the teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine. 94
The reasoning for this conclusion is that "since the 1976 Act suggests that
courts should limit their inquiry to the existence of an employment
relationship, employees under long term contracts - such as academics -
may no longer argue that the factors surrounding their employment rebut
the presumption of employer ownership." 95  Accordingly, "the
circumstances under which the work was created and the expectations of
the parties have now become largely irrelevant., 96 "The dispositive issue is
whether production of scholarly material is 'within the scope of
employment,' that is, a part of the job."97 Some experts feel that "since
scholarship clearly is a factor in decisions regarding tenure, promotion,
salary increases, sabbatical leaves, and reduced teaching loads, scholarly
works should now belong to universities rather than to faculty members."
98
Although the Weinstein court "relied on academic tradition," 99 it has
been argued that tradition was "apparently not a factor in determining
copyright ownership under the 1976 Act."' 1 Proponents of this theory
believe that, "[t]he 1976 Act effectively preempted state common law of
copyright."' 0' Because of this, the argument continues that decisions like
Sherrill and Williams are not only "negligible in number and narrow in
scope, but they are based on outmoded law. ' '! 2  This theory is given
credence by the Supreme Court case of Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid ("CCNV").' °3 In that case, "the Court virtually rejected
the pre-Act judicial approach to determine a work made for hire."' 04 The
plaintiff in CCNV argued that "[n]owhere in the 1976 Act or in the Act's
93 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 396-97.
94 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 598.




99 Burr, supra note 7, at 140.
100 Id. See also May v. Morganelli Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also DuBoff, supra note 76, at 33.
101 Burr, supra note 7, at 140 citing 17 U.S.C. § 301.
102 Burr, supra note 7, at 140; see also Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L Rep. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1929);
see also Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
103 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,748 (1989).
104 Id. at 730; see also Burr, supra note 7, at 140.
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Legislative history does Congress state that it intended to.. .reject the pre-
Act judicial approach to identifying a work for hire employment
relationship. 10 5 However, the Supreme Court disagreed. According to
Justice Marshall, author of the court's unanimous opinion, "We are
unpersuaded. Ordinarily, 'Congress' silence is just that . . . silence."'
Accordingly, since "Congress failed to incorporate the 'teacher exception'
in the 1976 Act or its legislative history," professors have to face this
obstacle in attempting to apply the academic exception to their scholarly
works. 17
However, there are still signs that the academic exception continues to
exist. Judge Posner in Hayes disputed "that the 1976 Act abolished the
teacher exception" because he argued that if the exception was abolished
by Congress, then why was there no discussion of this abolition in the 1976
Act's legislative history?10 8  Furthermore, Posner hypothesized that a
conclusion that the exception no longer exists "would wreak havoc 'in the
settled practices of academic institutions."' 1 9 By making this statement,
Posner implies that the academic exception for scholarly works is still the
standard practice in universities, despite the work for hire doctrine.1 0
Another valid point is that "the language of the work made for hire
provisions of the 1976 Act did not preclude the continued existence of an
exception for professors.""' The reasoning for this argument is that "the
1976 act incorporates a definition of employees work made for hire which
codified language developed in cases decided under the 1909 act: 'a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.'
''1 2
Thus, the common-law exception for professors from the work for hire
doctrine arguably still exists because, "there's nothing in the 1976 Act
legislative history to suggest that the common-law exception for professors
from the common law definition of work made for hire was eradicated by
the Act.""' 3
Another theory is that, "the legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to alter the definition of works for hire with respect to works
prepared by independent contractors on special order or commission, but it
appears that the definition vis-a-vis employees was meant to remain
105 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 749.
106 See Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987).
107 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 749.
108 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 404.
109 Id.
110 Id.
II I Lape, supra note 34, at 237.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 238.
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unchanged."'" 4 This argument continues that the "1976 Act offers no
definition for the phrase 'prepared within the scope of his or her
employment,' and the legislative history states that this provision
constitutes an adoption of the 'present law."' 1 5 Another point in defense
of the academic exception is that "the assumption follows that Congress
intended prior decisions interpreting the work for hire doctrine under the
1909 Act to define the language of the current statute.""16 Additionally it
can be argued that "if prior law is the appropriate guide, courts should
continue to recognize the Williams 'teacher exception' .. 117 Thus, it can
reasonably be concluded that "the 1976 Act did not disturb the professors'
exception from the work made for hire doctrine.. .it continues to exist."'" 8
The policy reasons behind giving scholars full rights to the works they
create is that it promotes free discussion of ideas for the ultimate goal of
academic excellence. "Stripping these rights from authors restricts their
incentive to write."119 Without the common law academic exception, based
on academic tradition, professors would have very little legal basis to claim
the copyright of their scholarly work. Thus, as Judge Posner in Hays
explained, the "reasons for a presumption against finding academic
writings to be work made for hire are as forceful today as they ever
were."
120
IV. WHETHER PUBLISHING A SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IS WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Since the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, one of the issues which
has divided the case law regarding work for hire, has been the definition of
the clause "employee within the scope of his or her employment." This
clause is from subsection (1) of the work for hire statute.121 In order for the
work for hire doctrine to apply, the work must be prepared by the employee
within the scope of his or her employment. The relevance of the clause is
that if professors can prove that writing the scholarly article is not within
their job duties or within the scope of employment, then an academic
exception is not needed because it will not be construed as a work for hire.
114 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 397.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 398.
118 Lape, supra note 34, at 246. This statement was made in 1992, after the Community for
Creative Non-Violence case.
119 Luzum, supra note 4, at 376.
120 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 404.
121 U.S.C. §101(1).
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The decision as to whether the work at issue was produced within the scope
of employment will determine who owns the copyright.
122
By arguing a "narrow construction of 'scope of employment,' 123 the
professor would claim that even though the employer pays the professor's
salary, that salary is for teaching and not for writing scholarly articles.
Additionally, the professor can argue that the university often has little or
no direction, control or supervision over the professor's article and that the
professor often generates the ideas, concepts and does the analysis of the
work himself.124  Another point that bolsters this argument is that
professors select their own "research goals, procure their own funding,
determine their research strategy, and choose the format through which
their findings are expressed."' 125 Although universities pay faculty salaries,
support research, exercise aspects of control over the sorts of scholarship
that counts toward advancement, and make library and other facilities
available for scholarly pursuits, these activities do not prove that the
university was the motivating force behind the work. 126  According to
Judge Posner in Hays, a "college or university does not supervise its faculty
in the preparation of academic books and articles .,,27 These arguments
lend support to the claim that the university professors work relationship
falls under a narrow construction of the term employment and thus work
for hire should not apply to them.
The most important factor for determining whether the work is within
the scope of employment is determining what is "the employer's right to
direct, control, and supervise the employee's work."'' 28 A certain level of
control by the employer exists, since in most universities, "faculty members
are expected to publish books or articles within their particular subject,,129 ,,4 -- 3
area. Approval of research projects is informal, if necessary at all."'3°
Publications are "expected .. .to meet standards of both quality and
quantity and occasionally, frequency.'' In addition, "control and
supervision also exist to the extent that the faculty member is required to
publish scholarly material in a particular field." 32 Another factor is the
122 Buff, supra note 7, at 140.
123 Luzum, supra note 4, at 376.
124 See generally Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
125 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 603.
126 Id. at 597.
127 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 404.
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quality of "both of the work and of the publication the work appears in.' 33
The employment contract also has importance for deciding this issue.
Whether the contract contains an express requirement that the faculty
member perform research and write scholarly articles is important.'
34
Usually, a professor must publish to gain tenure as well . . . every new
faculty member knows he must "publish or perish"' 35 In addition, claims of
employment are bolstered by the fact that universities also bear most of the
costs related to scholarly research. These costs "include supplies, offices,
personnel, telephones, furniture, computers, research aides and travel
fees.' 36 Thus, colleges and universities appear to have a strong argument
that scholarly writings fit the course of employment tests used to determine
if a work is made for hire.'
37
A professor will have difficulty proving that he is an independent
contractor due to the strong employment relationship.' 38  Thus, most
teachers are certainly considered employees. "In legal jargon one would say
that a master servant relationship exists between the school and teacher."
39
However, it is not "an easy task to determine precisely what the phrase
'within the scope of his or her employment' means for school teachers.""' 4
"Where the answer to the employee question is yes, the remaining question




Unfortunately for professors, the court in Weinstein acknowledged that
a literal reading of the work for hire statute gives ownership of scholarly
articles to universities. This occurred when the Weinstein court stated that
because "a university 'requires' its scholars to write," the university's
"demands--especially the demands of departments deciding whether to
award tenure-will be 'the motivating factor in the preparation of many a
scholarly work."'' 42 Since publication by professors is usually expected by
universities "and is therefore a part of the professor's employment
responsibilities; the works produced miht therefore be found to have been
created at the employer's insistence." The issue hinges upon whether
133 Id.
34 Id. at 503.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 504.
137 Id. at 505.
138 For an analysis of whether a professor is an employee or an independent contractor, see
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
139 VerSteeg, supra note 9. at 387.
140 Id. at 388.
141 Smith, supra note 42, at 710.
142 Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F. 2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
143 Lape, supra note 34, at 223.
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scholarly works are in fact found to be "publications required as a
condition of promotion and tenure and produced during the university
contract period." 144 Publications of that type "may be considered within
the scope of employment because they are required to fulfill the professor's
duties to the university."'' 45 It does not help the professor's argument that
"academics are hired by universities with the understanding that in addition
to teaching, they will conduct research, analyze their research, and publish
the results of their analysis."' 46 Professors are faced with the fact that they
must "publish or perish"'147 in order to advance their professional standing.
Proponent of this interpretation argue that "scholarly writings and other
faculty work products, including the fruits of some externally sponsored
research projects, meet the scope of employment test of the Act's made for
hire provision . . ., Under this interpretation, academic writings are
work for hire.
However, while most universities require scholarly writing, there is
room for debate whether particular academic articles, publications outside
the academic institution, are actually within the scope of a professor's
employment. There may be "scholarly works that fall outside the
academician's duties or works that are produced outside of the contract
period, and are, therefore, outside the scope of the academician's
employment."'' 49 Some examples of these situations are "works produced
by non-tenured faculty members beyond the number needed for promotion
and tenure purposes as determined by the university's department, and
perhaps all works produced by tenured faculty members that are not a
condition for merit raises.,,150 Another example is "works that are prepared
during the one day a week that universities usually allow for outside work,
or works that are prepared during a summer when the faculty member did
not receive a research grant."
15
'
In 1989, the Supreme Court offered some guidance on the scope of
employment issue in the case of Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid.1 52 In this case, CCNV, a non-profit association, commissioned Mr.
Reid to create a sculpture. Once the sculpture was complete, both Reid and
CCNV claimed to own the copyright to the work of art. CCNV claimed
144 Bur, supra note 7, at 141.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 119.
147 Weinstein, 811 F. 2d at 1094.
148 Smith, supra note 42, at 711.
149 Burr, supra note 7, at 142.
ISO Id.
151 Id.
152 Community for Ceaive Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 730 (1989).
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copyright under the work for hire doctrine. In contrast, Reid claimed that
since he created the work, he was the rightful owner of the copyright. The
court held that Reid was the author of the work under the Copyright Act,
and that he was not an employee of CCNV since the sculpture was not
prepared within the scope of employment. Instead, the court found that
Reid was an independent contractor who was able to copyright the work of
art.
Although the facts in CCNV fall outside the education field, the case is
relevant to the scope of employment issue because it has "implications for
determining whether the educator is an employee"'' 53 within the scope of
employment. CCNV offers thirteen factors for determining when a hired
party is an employee or an independent contractor.' 5 4 When these factors
are applied to the academic context, the result is difficult to determine.
"Scholarly works produced by academics may or may not be considered
works for hire because while four of the thirteen factors weigh in favor of
the faculty member and four of the factors weigh in favor of the university,
the remaining five factors have equities for both sides."'
55
The court in CCNV strongly suggests that "Congress intended 'scope of
employment' to be defined under the general common law of agency."'
5 6
The Restatement considers work as occurring within the scope of
employment when "(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c)
it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]". 15 7
Thus, the court in CCNV suggests another way to interpret the scope of
employment clause.
V. WEB PAGE PUBLISHING ISSUES
Scope of employment is also involved when a professor publishes his
scholarly work on a university owned web page. One issue is whether the
web page is part of the university community or a part of the global
Internet? The answer hinges on whether the professor or the university
initiates the scholarly work. Another issue is whether the professor's
writing is in response to a university's general publication requirement for
continued employment. If the writing is due to this requirement, then that
will constitute a work for hire, unless the academic exception is in effect.
153 Smith, supra note 42, at 705.
154 Burr, supra note 7, at 120.
155 Id. at 140.
156 Id.
157 RESTAEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §228 (1957).
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Another factor to consider is whether the university exercises any
editorial control over the published article. The Weinstein court stated that
it makes more sense to only give the university a work for hire right in
areas such as administrative writings... like a university published report
for example, but not for scholarly works. 158 But does the fact that the
scholarly work is located on the university server bring it further away from
the academic exception and closer to a university related writing? It is
important to consider whether this article is on a professor's official or
unofficial web page, meaning what connection to the university does this
page have? These aspects will influence whether the exception will apply.
To clarify, an official web page is one created by the university to inform
web site visitors about their faculty's accomplishments and qualifications.
In contrast, an unofficial web page is one that the professor creates
independently, but often is located on the school server, and the professor
alone is responsible for all aspects of programming and content selection.
The reason this distinction is important has to do with the independence of
the scholarly article from the employment relationship. The fact that a
professor published an article on his own private web page may not count
as work within the scope of his employment.
Whether the professor created his own web page may be of some
importance. The academic exception to work for hire may not apply if the
professor did not create his own web page, but instead had the university
computer department or his secretary create the web page and post the
article for him. The involvement of the additional parties to the creation of
the work could bring in the aspect of a collective work from the work for
hire definition. Also, the work done by the computer department or the
secretary would be work for hire, since there is no academic exception for
non-faculty members. These facts might give the university a stronger
claim on the copyright, assuming these other people involved in the
production of the work are university employees.
Also relevant is the issue of whether it would be considered
independent publishing for a professor to create an unofficial web page on
a school server. If it were considered independent publishing, then the web
page and articles published on it would be outside the scope of
employment. If the unofficial page falls within the work for hire definition,
then it could be considered more like publishing in an internal university
bulletin.'59
158 Luzum, supra note 4, at 371. See also Manasa v. University of Miami, 320 So. 2d 467 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a university owned the copyright to a funding proposal written by an
administrative officer).
159 Luzum, supra note 4, at 371.
1998]
166 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:149
Another related issue is that universities usually own their web server.
One result of this ownership is that universities often have policies stating
that all information and files saved on the server become the property of the
university. The key question here would be whether the academic
exception for scholarly writings gets around these policies. This question
draws comparisons to the Weinstein case, where there was an express
copyright policy that the court chose to ignore in favor of the academic
exception.
While professors may argue that the creation of their scholarly work is
not within the scope of employment, academic writings published on web
pages may be construed as within the scope of employment if those articles
are being done to meet the scholarship requirements for tenure.160 Another
related problem is that most professors use their employed period of time,
the work week, to work on their scholarly articles. This detracts from the
argument of the work not being within the scope of employment.
Additionally, it can be argued that scholarly writings fall within the course
of employment because "aspects of employment, such as availability of
resources" point to the idea that scholars are working for hire.
16 1
VI. STRATEGIES FOR PROFESSORS TO OBTAIN COPYRIGHTS IN THEIR
SCHOLARLY WORKS
While Judge Posner's discussion of the inapplicability of the 1976
Act's work for hire provisions to teachers is dicta, the fact that it is "from a
court and jurist as well respected as the Seventh Circuit and Judge Posner
will be difficult to ignore." Since Judge Posner's decision in Hays is the
most recent case directly discussing work for hire and the academic
exception, "if a school were to challenge a teacher's claim to copyright in
educational materials, Hays clearly would be a valuable tool for a teacher
claiming ownership under the 'teacher exception' theory."' 163  Judge
Posner's dicta in Hays suggests that if faced directly with the question of
the existence of teacher exception under the 1976 Copyright Act, courts
would respond that it does in fact exist. 64
But until that case comes along, professors would be wise to pursue
other measures besides the academic exception to secure the copyright to
their scholarly works. One suggestion is that "the simplest, most effective
way for professors to retain copyright in their scholarly publications is to
160 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 599.
161 Simon, supra note 28, at 486.
162 VerSteeg, supra note 9. at 405.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 412.
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obtain a written agreement expressly reserving those rights, as the
Copyright Act requires."165 "The maximum protection will be obtained by
an agreement which states that the faculty member's writings are not
considered works made for hire and are not produced in the course of
employment."' 66 Thus, the professor should attempt to incorporate a claim
for the copyright of his writings into his employment contract. 67 The
reason that a university might agree to such a clause in an employment
contract is that the university's main goal of the "prestige that faculty
writings bring" will be upheld regardless of such a clause. On the other
hand, that prestige may not be enough for some universities. Some schools
have "begun to take a more active interest in the financial dimensions of
the faculty's work product, and increasingly they have come to view
exploitation of scholarly output as a means of filling the revenue gaps left
by shrinking government grants and student tuition payments." 69 Even
though "[m]ost scholarly writing is geared to specialized journals which
offer little or no payment" to the author, 170 some universities feel that they
end up paying twice for research done by their professors.17' At the
California Institute of Technology, Provost Steven E. Koonin argues that
his school library spends a large portion of its budget on subscriptions to
high-priced, for profit journals that run articles about research by Caltech's
own faculty members. 72 Koonin proposes that journal publishers should
be told that they can only publish articles by Caltech researchers if the
authors and the university retain copyrights to the material. 73 Koonin says
he would "like to see Caltech and its faculty members jointly own and
retain rights to journal articles and license those copyrights to publishers on
a limited basis.' 74 This is a perfect example of a university trying to claim
a copyright in the professor's work. In a scenario like the one proposed at
Caltech, professors may be "risking their chances of publication in
respected journals."'7 5 Professors who obtain an express copyright to their
scholarly works in their employment agreement will maintain control of
their articles and will be at liberty to protect their own interests,
165 Simon, supra note 28, at 509.
166 Id.
167 See generally Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 409 U.S. 730 (1989).
168 Buff, supra note 7, at 143.
169 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 591-92.
170 Simon, supra note 28, at 507.
171 Lisa Guernsey, A Provost Challenges His Faculty to Keep Copyright on Journal Articles,
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One way for the professor to handle the employment agreement issues
is for the professor is to negotiate a clause in his employment contract that
states that the university recognizes and agrees to abide by the academic
exception to the work for hire doctrine for academic writings. This clear
language will resolve any ambiguity that Congress' silence on the issue has
caused. The effect of this language will be to rebut the presumption that
the employer is the copyright owner.176
Another issue that arises is whether a written university copyright
policy even "satisfies the section 204(a) requirement of a writing signed by
the professor, or the section 201(b) requirement of a writing signed by the
professor and the university.' 77  In addition, "while many faculty
handbooks announce policies favoring faculty retention of copyright,
handbooks are unlikely to be considered signed writings" by courts.
178
However, a good strategy for a professor is to expressly incorporate a
beneficial handbook copyright policy by reference into a writing signed by
the professor and the university.'7 9 Still, the typical institution of higher
education does not have an applicable policy; even for the few who do, the
policy is not sufficient unless contained or perhaps incorporated in an
agreement signed by both parties. 18° This is relevant to publishing an
article on a university web page. The ramifications are that a clause in a
university acceptable use policy for university computer systems, which
states that files stored on the computer system become the property of the
university, appears not to be binding on the professor unless there is an
express signed writing between the professor and the university to that
effect. Thus, the university can not seize a professor's web page files
without an express agreement allowing the school to do so. Conversely,
professors should not be soothed by beneficial "statements of policy in
various university bylaws, operating guidelines, and regulations. In
court, "these documents will not replace an express written agreement and
are probably not a formal part of the employment contract."'
18 2
Professors may also attempt to circumvent the work for hire doctrine
by preparing work "under a grant, one time contract or fellowship."'
83
These methods may be "considered 'commissioned' under section 101" of
176 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 599.
rn Lape, supra note 34, at 248.
179 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 600.
179 See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 600. See also Weinstein v. University of linois, 811
F. 2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
19o Smith, supra note 42, at 71 1.
181 Simon, supra note 28, at 513.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 510 citing 17 U.S.C. §101.
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the 1976 Copyright Act "because under that section, a commissioned work
may be considered a work made for hire only if expressly agreed by the
parties. '
Vii. CONCLUSION
If a professor does not have an express agreement giving the copyright
to himself, and if the academic exception is not applied, then the
"professor's best approach in court is to convince the court that the work
was not prepared within the course of employment, which may be
difficult."'185 Thus, the most prudent course of action is for professors to
obtain an express written agreement with the university where he is
employed which grants copyright to the professor for his scholarly works,
either upon taking an employment position or as soon as practical if already
employed. Despite the arguments available to the professor via the dicta of
the Seventh Circuit, the most prudent strategy for the professor under the
current copyright law is to take affirmative steps to assure copyright control
over scholarly writings. By doing this, university faculty best protect their
interests. If the professor decides to move from school to school and would
like to continue to have control over his writings, this type of agreement is
an especially good idea. 86 Additionally, by signing an express agreement,
professors will protect their legitimate interests in the recognition achieved
by creating original materials, as well as "protecting their interest in
reaping whatever financial rewards are available from exploiting their
original works in the marketplace."'' 87  If Congress had specifically
incorporated the "teacher exception" into the 1976 Copyright Act or in its
legislative history, then this type of express agreement would not be
necessary to protect the professor's rights. But since Congress did not
expressly consider "the effect of the new statute on environments like
universities" and codify the 'teacher' exception' into the 1976 Act,
professors must rely on dicta or express agreements to secure their creative
rights. Therefore, while professors may prevail without an express
agreement, it is the most prudent course of action to protect a professor's
copyright rights in his scholarly articles.
184 Simon, supra note 28, at 510.
185 Id.
186 VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 409-10.
187 Id. at 410.188 Dreyfuss, supra note 27, at 639.
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